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Abstract
In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of network of collaboration
in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form
links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We
also present some results on efficient networks.
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1 Introduction
Research collaborations among firms take a variety of forms, such as joint ventures,
technology sharing or joint R&D (Hagedoorn, 2006). These collaborations are often
bilateral and non exclusive, and form a network of collaborative links between firms.
By forming collaborative links, firms alter the competitive positions of competitors and
influence market structure and performance. It is then important to develop models of
network formation between firms in order to predict the architectures of the networks
that should emerge and examine to what extent these networks are socially efficient.
Goyal and Joshi (GJ, 2003) propose a model of network formation which addresses
these questions for situations in which firms compete on a oligopoly market. Collabo-
rative links between firms lower marginal costs. However these links are costly and the
costs are fixed and uniform across links. Westbrock (2010) investigates efficient net-
works in this setting albeit with differentiated products. Certain architectures emerge
as candidates for stable and efficient networks. In the case that has maximum relevance
for us, namely quantity competition in a homogeneous oligopoly with small costs of
link formation, the complete network is both stable and efficient. In more general set-
tings, stars, interlinked stars and dominant group architectures emerges as candidates
for stable and efficient networks.
Now competition between firms in few markets is a prominent feature of modern
economies. In a seminal paper, Bulow et al. (1985) show how the introduction of
multimarket competition can produce quite unexpected findings compare to standard
results in industrial organization. We can then ask what happens to equilibrium and
efficient networks when we introduce multimarket competition in the GJ’s model of
formation of collaborative networks.
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This paper gives a first insight at this question. We assume for purposes of simplicity
heterogeneous product markets, with linear demand curves and quadratic cost functions,
where multimarket competitors can form quality products enhancing collaborative links
on one market.1 Our paper is different from the two earlier papers that follows the
framework introduced by Bloch (1995) in the sense that links reduce marginal costs.
We follow the line of reasoning laid down by Chakrabarti and Haller (2011). In that
paper, firm can make costly investments that increase its demand and reduce the de-
mand of other firms. These investments are interpreted as negative advertising. Here,
investments increase the demand of both firms making the investment and interpreted
as collaborative R&D activity. These investments take the form of costly links where
the link increases the demand of both firms forming the link by a fixed amount. We
restrict ourselves to quantity competition and use a similar demand function to that of
Singh and Vives (1984), Westbrock (2010) and Chakrabarti and Haller (2011).
Our findings concerning equilibrium networks are quite similar to those of GJ (2003),
that is equilibrium networks have still a dominant group architecture, i.e. a group of
firms are linked to each other while other firms have no links at all. We show that this
result follows from the fact that our collaborative multimarket game qualifies as playing
the field games (Goyal and Joshi, 2006), with payoff function satisfying convexity in own
links as well as the strategic substitutes property with regard to quantities. However,
using Bulow et al. (1985) analysis, we show that contrary to the model of GJ (2003) there
exist situations where competitors do not form collaborative links in order to increase the
1Considering that firms can form links on one market only is admittedly restrictive. However, it
allows us to deal with situations where products innovation is a strategic issue for only one market, and
there is little to gain by forming collaborative links that will increase the quality of the product on the
second market. Besides this restrictive assumption simplifies the analysis and allows us to give a first
insight on the impact of multi-market competition on the collaborative networks.
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quality of their products even if these links have no costs. This result follows from the
fact that there are joint diseconomies across markets and goods produced by competing
firms are strategic substitutes. It illustrates how the intermarket effect play a key role
in the incentive of firms to collaborate.
With regard to efficient networks, though we cannot arrive at a precise characteriza-
tion of these networks, we can derive some interesting properties of such networks and
restrict the set of networks that are efficient into a small group. More precisely, we show
that efficient networks belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs. 2 These architectures
have interesting features. In particular, they consist of only one component, that is effi-
cient networks are such that firms which have formed links are all directly or indirectly
linked. Moreover the diameter of the non-singleton component is very low since firms
are at most at distance 2 from each other. Besides it turns out that equilibrium and
efficient networks do not coincide.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and discusses
the notation and terminology. Section 3 examines equilibrium networks, while Sections
4 deals with efficient networks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework
2.1 The Multi-market Cournot Model
Suppose there are n firms indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n (where n ≥ 3) that compete a` la
Cournot in two inter-related markets 1 and 2. The set of all firms is denoted by N .
We denote by qi and Qi the quantities sold by firm i on markets 1 and 2 respectively,
2We thank one of the referees for pointing out this general characteristic of efficient networks in our
framework.
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and by pi and Pi the prices of firm i’s products on these markets. Focusing on the
most interesting case, we assume that competitors’ products are strategic substitutes
and there are diseconomies of scope across markets.3 .
More specifically, demand in markets 1 and 2 for firm i are respectively given by
pi = αi − qi −
∑
j 6=i
qj ; Pi = βi −Qi −
∑
j 6=i
Qj . (1)
The cost function of a firm i is given by
Ci(qi, Qi) =
1
2
(qi +Qi)
2. (2)
Since ∂
2Ci(qi,Qi)
∂qi∂Qi
= 2(qi +Qi) > 0, there are diseconomies of costs across markets.
The profits of each firm i ∈ N can be written as:
pii =
αi − qi −∑
j 6=i
qj
 · qi +
βi −Qi −∑
j 6=i
Qj
 ·Qi − 1
2
(qi +Qi)
2. (3)
2.2 Quality Improving Links and Collaborative Networks
Assume that firms can improve the quality of their products via collaborative links in
only market 1. More specifically, we suppose that for each firm i ∈ N we have
αi(g) = γ0 + γ · ηi(g) (4)
where ηi(g) is the number of links formed by firm i in the network g. Link formation is
costly and the cost of forming each link is given by c ≥ 0 and is incurred by both firms
forming the link.
3Formally, let pii(q1, ..., qi, ...qn, Q1, ..., Qi, ..Qn) be the profits function of firm i. Competitors’ prod-
ucts are strategic substitutes on market 1 whenever ∂
2pii
∂qi∂qj
< 0. Let Ci(qi, Qi) be the cost function of a
firm i. There are diseconomies (economies) of scope across markets whenever ∂
2Ci(qi,Qi)
∂qi∂Qi
> (<) 0
5
A collaborative network g is a list of pairs of firms who are linked to each other. For
simplicity, we denote the link between i and j (where i 6= j) by ij. So ij ∈ g indicates i
and j are linked in the network g. A network g is a formal descriptions of the pair-wise
collaborative links that exist between firms. Let G denote the set of all networks. We let
g + ij denote the network formed by adding the link ij to the network g, g − ij denote
the network formed by deleting the link ij from the network g.
A firm i’s neighborhood Ni(g) is given by {j ∈ N\{i}|ij ∈ g}. We define as Li(g) =
{ij ∈ g | j ∈ Ni(g)} ⊂ g the set of links in which firm i is involved. Let λ(g) = 12
∑
i∈N
ηi(g)
be the total number of links in a network g. For any h ⊂ g, let g−h denotes the network
formed by deleting the set of links h from the network g. Similarly, for h ⊂ gN\g, g+ h
denotes the network formed by adding the links set h to the network g. Moreover we
define g−i as the resulting network once we remove all firm i’s links from the network g.
A path in g connecting i and j is a set of distinct firms {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ⊂ N with p ≥ 2
such that i1 = i, ip = j, and {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , ip−1ip} ⊂ g. We say i and j are connected to
each other if a path exists between them and they are disconnected otherwise. Given a
network g, we define a component as a set C(g) ⊂ N such that for all i, j ∈ C(g) there
exists a path between i and j and there does not exist a path between a player i ∈ C(g)
and a player j 6∈ C(g). A component C(g) is complete if for all distinct i, j ∈ C(g),
ij ∈ g. Firms who are not connected in the network g are named singletons. We define
three network architectures that play a role in this paper. The network gN in which all
firms are linked with each other is referred to as the complete network and the network
g0 in which all firms are singletons is referred to as the empty network. The dominant
group architecture gk is characterized by one complete non-singleton component with
|Nk| ≥ 2 and n− |Nk| singletons.
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2.3 Equilibrium and Efficient Networks
A network is a strongly pair-wise stable network 4 if
(a) for all i ∈ N and h ⊂ Li (g), pii(g) ≥ pii(g − h), and
(b) for all i ∈ N , j ∈ N , and ij /∈ g, if pii(g + ij) > pii(g) then pij(g + ij) < pij(g).
For any network g, and h ⊂ gN\g, we denote the variation of benefit from links formation
by ∆pii(g, h) = pii(g + h)− pii(g).
Next, we define efficient networks. Let CS be consumers’ surplus function and Π be
firms’ aggregate profits function. The welfare function W is given by:
W (g) = CS(g) + Π(g)
A network g is an efficient network if g maximizes the welfare function, that is W (g) ≥
W (g′) for all g′ 6= g. We say that g is efficient for firms (consumers) if it maximizes the
aggregate profits of firms (surplus of consumers). For any network g, and h ⊂ gN\g,
we denote the variation in welfare and total profits resulting from link formation by
∆W (g, h) = W (g + h)−W (g) and ∆Π(g, h) = Π(g + h)−Π(g) respectively.
3 Characterization of Equilibrium Networks
Although the payoff functions are quite complicated, this game has features similar to
the game analyzed by Goyal and Joshi (2006). Hence we will invoke their results here.
Definition 1 A network game is called playing the field game if the payoff function of
firm i is a function of her degree, ηi (g), and the total number of links in g−i, λ (g−i):
pii (g) = Φ (ηi (g) , λ (g−i)) .
4Our definition can be seen as a generalization of stable networks given in GJ (2003), since in GJ no
firm has an incentive to delete one of its links or all its links in a stable network.
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Definition 2 The payoff function Φ is convex in its own links if the marginal returns
Φ (k + 1, l)− Φ (k, l) is strictly increasing in k.
Definition 3 Suppose l′ > l. The payoff function Φ satisfies the strategic substitutes
property if Φ (k + 1, l′)− Φ (k, l′) < Φ (k + 1, l)− Φ (k, l).
It is easy to check from the equilibrium profits function, Φ(k, l), given in Appendix
6.1. that the collaborative multimarket game qualifies as playing the field game. Fur-
thermore, we show that this function satisfies convexity in own links as well as the
strategic substitutes property. Indeed, define
∆Φ(k, l) = Φ (k + 1, l)− Φ (k, l)
. The equilibrium profits function satisfies convexity in own links, since we have
∆Φ(k + 1, l)−∆Φ(k, l) = (11n
4 + 44n3 − 6n2 − 100n+ 83)γ2
9(n+ 3)2(n+ 1)2
> 0
Likewise, the equilibrium profits function satisfies the strategic substitutes property,
since we have
∆Φ(k, l + 1)−∆Φ(k, l) = −2γ
2(11n3 + 62n2 + 91n+ 4)
(n+ 3)2(n+ 1)2)
< 0.
Therefore, we get from GJ (2006, p.327, Proposition 3.1) the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The strongly pair-wise stable network is either complete or empty or has
a dominant group architecture.
Remark 1. We can check that the empty network can be a strongly pair-wise
stable network, even when costs of forming links are null. For instance, suppose n = 6,
γ0 = 100, γ = 0.05, βi = 400 for all i ∈ N , and f = 0. We have ∆Φ(0, 0) = −0.09 < 0,
8
so no firm has an incentive to form a link in the empty network, and the latter is a
strongly pair-wise stable network. It follows that in some situations firms will not form
collaborative links in order to increase the quality of their products even if these links
have no costs.
The intuition behind this fact, inspired from Bulow et al. (1985), is as follows: The
formation of a link by firms i and j in market 1 enhances the quality of their product
in this market and leads these firms to produce more for this market. Due to joint
diseconomies across markets this reduces marginal profitability for firms i and j in
market 2 and induces these firms to lower their quantities on this market. Because of
strategic substitutability, rival firms will increase their quantities on market 2 and this
induces a loss in market 2, and possibly an overall loss, for firms i and j. Note that
in the one-market Cournot model of GJ (2003), the dominant group architecture can
emerge only if there are substantial link formation costs.
Remark 2. As in GJ we find that the impact of the costs of link formation on the size
of the non-singleton component is non-monotonic: for low costs, the complete network is
uniquely stable, for moderate costs only networks with relatively large dominant groups
are stable, for high costs, only medium size non-singleton components are stable (small
and large groups are not sustainable), while for very high costs, the empty network is
uniquely stable. The example below illustrates the fact that for high costs, only medium
size non-singleton components are stable.
Example 1 Let n = 50, γ0 = 749, γ = 0.45, βi = 400, for all i ∈ N . Straightforward
computations show that for f = 9.7, only the empty network and dominant-group net-
works, gk, such that k is at least equal to 7 and at most equal to 21 can be strongly
pair-wise stable.
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Remark 3. In the case with Economies of scope across markets, there is no tension
across the markets anymore. The formation of a link by firms i and j in market 1
enables both firms to produce larger quantities on both markets. Thus profits of both
firms increase in equilibrium. Clearly, under zero link costs, the complete network is the
only equilibrium network, i.e. we obtain the same result as in Goyal and Joshi model
(2003) where firms compete only on one market.
4 Characterization of Efficient Networks
Efficient networks are hard to characterize and we provide a partial characterization for
n ≥ 4 firms.5.The first lemma present a result on the consumers’ surplus function which
simplifies the characterization of efficient networks (the proof is in appendix).
Lemma 1 For any network g, (i) the consumers’ surplus function only depends on the
total number of collaborative links formed by firms, and (ii) this surplus function is
convex in the total number of links formed.
Proof The proof of (i) and (ii) is straightforward since the expression of consumers’
surplus function is given by
CS(g) =
(n2 + 4n+ 5)(α¯2 + β¯2)− 4(n+ 2)α¯β¯
(3 + 4n+ n2)2
,
where α¯ = nγ0 + 2γλ(g) > 0, and β¯ =
∑n
i=1 βi > 0. 
The following lemma considers a network g in which links ik and im do not exist,
while firm m has formed at least as many links as firm k in g. This lemma allows us to
state that if total profits of firms increase when the link ik is added to the network g,
5Goyal and Joshi (2003) do not provide efficiency results for the one market case stating that this is
a hard problem.
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then total profits also increases when the link im is adding to the network g + ik and
this increase is of a greater magnitude (the proof of this lemma is in appendix).
Lemma 2 For any network g and firms i, k,m ∈ N such that ik, im /∈ g and ηm(g) ≥
ηk(g), we have ∆Π(g + ik, im) > ∆Π(g, ik)
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain the following lemma (the proof is in appendix).
Lemma 3 For any network g and firm i such that ik, im /∈ g and ηm(g) ≥ ηk(g), we
have ∆W (g + ik, im) > ∆W (g, ik).
The proposition that follows from lemma 3 gives an important characteristic of
efficient networks.
Proposition 1 Efficient networks g belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs (NSG).
Proof First we show that in an efficient network g, the following condition is satisfied
(C1): if ij ∈ g and ik /∈ g, then ηj(g) > ηk(g). Let ∆W (g, ij) be the marginal change
in welfare when the link ij is added to the network g. Suppose there exists an efficient
network g and ij ∈ g and ik /∈ g. Then, ∆W (g − ij, ij) ≥ 0. Suppose, towards a con-
tradiction, ηk(g) ≥ ηj(g). This implies by Lemma 3 that ∆W (g, ik) > 0 contradicting
that g is efficient. Hence, for all k such that ik /∈ g, ηk(g) < ηj(g).
Second, we show that if a network g satisfies the condition (C1), then g belongs to the
class of NSG. Belhaj, Bervoets, and Dero¨ıan (2013, p.9) define a NGS as a graph which
satisfies the following condition (C2): if ij ∈ g and ηk(g) ≥ ηj(g), then ik ∈ g.
Conditions (C1) and (C2) are clearly equivalent. It follows that if g is an efficient net-
work, then g belongs to the class of NSG.
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There is an interesting effect behind Condition (C1). Let a network g and firms
i, k,m ∈ N such that ik ∈ g and im /∈ g. Suppose that we substitute the link im to
the link ik in g. The total number of links is the same in network g as in network
g − ik + im. It follows from Lemma 1 (i) that the consumer surplus does not change
when we substitute the link im to the link ik in the network g. Therefore consumers’
surplus plays no role in the result of Proposition 1. Moreover, since the total number
of links is the same in the network g as in the network g − ik + im, the total costs
of forming links also plays no role in the result of Proposition 1. Therefore, the result
of Proposition 1 lies only on the total profits (gross of the costs of forming links) of
firms. This Proposition highlights the fact that if firms could act in a cooperative way
at the links formation stage of the multi-market oligopoly game, then they would have
an incentive to act toward some kind of concentration (of increase of the Gini coefficient)
of links distribution among them: it would be better for firms (and for social welfare)
that a firm poorly linked firm k gives up to a collaboration it has established with a firm
i in network g and let firm i set up an additional collaboration with a firm m which has
already set up more collaborations that firm k in g.
Remark 3. Since efficient networks belong to the class of NGS, it follows that if
a network g is an efficient network, then g has two properties (i) g contains at most
one component. (ii) The geodesic distance between any two connected firms in g is at
most 2. This means that in an efficient network all firms which have formed links are
connected, and connected firms are very close one from each other.
Remark 4. It is worth noting that the architectures of strongly pair-wise stable and
efficient networks share some similarities. First, in both cases all firms that have formed
collaborative links are directly or indirectly linked together. Moreover, in both cases too
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the maximal distance between these firms is very low: one for strongly pair-wise stable
networks, two for efficient networks. However as illustrated by the following example, for
some parameters values, architectures of strongly pair-wise stable and efficient networks
are very different.
Example 2 Let n = 50, γ0 = 749, γ = 0.45, βi = 400, for all i ∈ N . We know from
Example 1 that for f = 9.7, only the empty network and dominant-group networks, gk,
such that k is at least equal to 7 and at most equal to 21 can be strongly pair-wise stable.
Straightforward computations show that these architectures are less efficient than the
complete network.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, our aim was to ask what happens to equilibrium and efficient networks
when we introduce multimarket competition in the GJ’s model of formation of collab-
orative networks. We have shown that although equilibrium architectures are of the
same type as in GJ, a complete network needs not materialize in equilibrium when
costs of links are null as it is the case in GJ. With regard to efficiency, we have shown
that efficient networks belong to the class of NGS. Therefore, efficient networks have
the interesting features of this class of graphs. In particular, they consist of only one
component, that is efficient networks are such that firms which have formed links are
all directly or indirectly linked. Moreover the diameter of the non-singleton component
is very low since firms are at most at distance 2 from each other.
We now briefly discuss some issues that could be explored in future work. First, we
need to examine the case where firms can form links on both markets. This will allow
us to check the robustness of our results and to know in particular whether other types
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of architectures can emerge as strongly pair-wise stable networks. Second, it will be
interesting to adapt the model of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales (2001), and to introduce
in our model the possibility for each firm to unilaterally choose a level of effort in R&D
in order to increase the quality of its product, given the collaboration network. This
will allow us to us to examine the impact of bilateral R&D collaboration on the level of
R&D activities.
6 Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium profits in Multi-market equilibrium
Differentiating (3) with respect to qi and Qi for each firm i ∈ N , we obtain the equilib-
rium quantities of each firm i:
q∗i =
(2n2 + 6n+ 1)αi − (n2 + 3n− 1)βi − (2n+ 5)
∑
j 6=i αj + (n+ 4)
∑
j 6=i βj
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
;
Q∗i =
(2n2 + 6n+ 1)βi − (n2 + 3n− 1)αi − (2n+ 5)
∑
j 6=i βj + (n+ 4)
∑
j 6=i αj
3(3 + 4n+ n2)
In order to ensure that each firm produces strictly positive quantities in equilibrium,
we will assume that the parameters γ0, γ, {βi} are such that for each firm i ∈ N we have
both :
γ0 >
γ(n− 1)(n− 2)(2n+ 5) + (n2 + 3n− 1)βi − (n+ 4)
∑
i 6=j βj
3(n+ 2)
,
γ0 >
−γ(n− 1)(n2 + 3n− 1) + (2n2 + 6n+ 1)βi − (2n+ 5)
∑
i 6=j βj
3
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.We obtain the second stage equilibrium profits by replacing qi and Qi by their equilib-
rium values, q∗i and Q
∗
i , in (3). Moreover, by replacing in the equilibrium profits αi by
γ0 − γηi and
∑
j 6=i αj by nγ0 +
∑
j 6=i ηj − ηi 6, the equilibrium profits function is given
by pii (g) = Φ (ηi (g) , λ (g−i)).
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the total consumer surplus of agents in both markets.
It is given by
CS =
∑
i
(αi − p∗i ) q∗i +
∑
i
(βi − P ∗i )Q∗i
where p∗i = αi−
n∑
i=1
q∗i and P
∗
i = βi−
n∑
i=1
Q∗ denotes prices in both markets at equilibrium.
Let q =
n∑
i=1
qi, Q =
n∑
i=1
Qi, α =
n∑
i=1
αi, and β =
n∑
i=1
βi . We have,
CS =
∑
i
(αi − p∗i ) q∗i +
∑
i
(βi − P ∗i )Q∗i
=
∑
i
(q∗) q∗i +
∑
i
(
Q
∗)
Q∗i
= (q∗)2 +
(
Q
∗)2
=
[
(n+ 2)α− β
3 + 4n+ n2
]2
+
[
(n+ 2)β − α
3 + 4n+ n2
]2
=
(n2 + 4n+ 5)
(
α2 + β
2
)
− 4(n+ 2)αβ
(3 + 4n+ n2)2
.
The proof of (i) follows directly the expression of the consumers’ surplus function
given above. As for the proof of (ii), consider any two arbitrary links ij and kl where
6we delete ηi in order to obtain the number of links formed in the network g−i
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neither link belongs to the network. We have,
∆CS(g + ij, kl)−∆CS(g, ij) = 8γ
2(n2 + 4n+ 5)
(3 + 4n+ n2)2
> 0.
It follows that the consumers’ surplus function is convex in the total number of links
formed. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose a network g and firms i, k,m ∈ N such that ik, im /∈ g
and ηm(g) ≥ ηk(g). The aggregate profit effect of link formation between i and k is
given by ∆Π(g, ik) = κ′
(
αi + αk − τ
′
n
∑
` 6=i,k α` + Λ
′
)
− 2c, where τ ′ > 0, κ′ > 0 and
Λ′ are constants independent of network structure and αi and αk are the values of the
demand intercept parameters before link formation commences7.
τ ′ has an upper bound less than 11 (at n = 2, its value is 10.79) and is strictly
decreasing in n. It has a lower bound of 2 and converges asymptotically to 2. It is
important to note that at n = 4, τ ′ = 3.5.
Hence, starting from an arbitrary network g with ik, im /∈ g, if firms i and k
form a link, the increase in aggregate profits can be written as
∆Π(g, ik)
κ′
= 2γ0 +
γ (ηi(g) + ηk(g))− τ
′
n
(
(n− 2)γ0 + γ
∑
`6=i,k,m ηl(g) + γηm(g)
)
+ Λ′ − 2c
κ′
.
Suppose then that firms i and m form a link. The increase in aggregate profits can be
written as
∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ′
=
∆Π(g, ik)
κ′
+ γ
(
2 + (1 +
τ ′
n
) (ηm(g)− ηk(g)− 1)
)
.
Since ηm(g) ≥ ηk(g), we have ∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ′
≥ ∆Π(g, ik)
κ′
+ γ
(
1− τ
′
n
)
.
We know that τ ′ = 3.5 for n = 4, hence
τ ′
n
< 1. Furthermore, we know that τ ′ is strictly
decreasing in n, hence
τ ′
n
is strictly decreasing in n. It follows that
τ ′
n
< 1 for all n ≥ 4.
As a result, we have
∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ′
>
∆Π(g, ik)
κ′
.

7Detailed calculations are available in the working paper version of this paper: http:
mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de /28188/1/MPRA−paper −28188.pdf
16
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose a network g and firms i, k,m ∈ N such that ik, im /∈ g
and ηm(g) ≥ ηk(g). We know from Lemma 2, that we have ∆Π(g + ik, im)
κ′
>
∆Π(g, ik)
κ′
,
with κ′. Besides we know that the consumers’ surplus function is convex (see Lemma
1), so we have
∆CS(g + ik, im)
κ′
>
∆CS(g, ik)
κ′
.
Since the welfare function is defined as W = Π + CS and the convexity property is
preserved under addition of two convex functions, we then have
∆W (g + ik, im)
κ′
>
∆W (g, ik)
κ′
, completing the proof. 
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